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The modern world is complex and dicult to understand for voters, who may
hold beliefs that are at variance with reality. Politicians face incentives to pander
to voters' beliefs to get reelected. We analyze the welfare eects of this pandering
and show that it entails both costs and benets. Moreover, we explore optimal
constitutional design in the presence of imperfect information about how the world
works. We compare indirect democracy to direct democracy and to delegation of
policy making to independent agents. We nd that indirect democracy is often
welfare maximizing.
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The best argument against democracy is a
ve-minute conversation with the average voter.
Winston Churchill
The world is complex and people may not properly understand how the modern society
and its economy function. In some cases, voters’ beliefs deviate substantially from the view
of experts. Caplan (2001) conducted a survey where he compares the opinions of the general
public to the opinions of economists with regard to a number of economic issues. For instance,
he asked people whether they think that trade agreements between the United States and other
countries have helped create more jobs in the U.S. He coded the answer that trade agreements
“have cost the U.S. jobs” as 0, that they “haven’t made much of a difference” as 1, and that
they “helped create jobs in the U.S.” as 2. He ﬁnds that the mean response among economists
is 1.47. In contrast, the mean response among the general audience is only .64. Caplan reports
similar discrepancies with respect to other economic issues.
As a result of imperfect knowledge about a complex world, voters may not always be able to
judge what policies are truly in their best interest and, as a consequence, hold incorrect beliefs.
Politicians who aim to get reelected have an incentive to pander to voters’ beliefs and hence to
potentially distort policies.
In this paper, we investigate the welfare consequences of politicians’ pandering to voters’
beliefs in the case of indirect democracy. Second, we explore the conditions under which other
forms of government may lead to higher welfare. In particular, we compare indirect democracy
to direct democracy and to the case where policy making is delegated to independent agents
who are experts in a particular ﬁeld.
In our model, welfare depends on a unidimensional policy action. In the case of indirect
democracy, policy is set by an ofﬁce-holding politician. In the case of direct democracy, it is
determined by voters themselves, whereas in the case of independent agents it is set by the
latter.
1We capture voters’ imperfect information by assuming that no voter observes which level
of the policy action is truly in their own best interest and in the best interest of society. Rather,
voters hold prior beliefs about the welfare effects of policy actions.
In the case of indirect democracy, there are two types of politicians in the model. The ﬁrst
type is dubbed competent. This means that he obtains a perfectly revealing signal about the
policy action that is best for society from an ex ante point of view. In contrast, the incompetent
politician receives a noisy signal about the optimal policy and is, thus, imperfectly informed
about the world. The assumption of the existence of incompetent politicians refers to the fact
that politicians may have incompetent advisers, or they may have ideological views (as may
voters). Politicians’ prime concern is to get reelected.
Voters aim to reelect a politician who appears competent whilst looking at the world through
the lenses of their beliefs. This characteristic provides an incentive to politicians to cater for the
pivotal voter’s belief in order to maximize their chance of getting reelected.
As it is usual in dynamic games of incomplete information, voters are endowed with a
belief about the behavior of politicians. Our analysis allows for (but is not restricted to) a type
of beliefs which include an element of bounded rationality. These beliefs are related to the
cognitive hierarchy model of Camerer et al. (2004). In a nutshell, we assume that voters may
anticipate a politician’s strategic response to their beliefs and, as a result, adapt their beliefs
by one additional order not more than k times. The number k may be ﬁnite or, in the case of
unlimited rationality, inﬁnite. We show that, for ﬁnite k, the prevailing political equilibrium is
a separating equilibrium, in which competent and incompetent politicians implement different
policies. For inﬁnite k, the prevailing equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium, in which both
politician types implement identical policies. These are exclusively determined by voters’ prior
beliefs and do not depend on the incumbent politician’s signal.
Our main positive result is that, under indirect democracy, the policy action is determined
as a weighted average of a politician’s signal and the pivotal voter’s prior belief. Thus, policy
making is partially populist (except for inﬁnite k, where it is fully populist). Importantly, as
2we will show, this populism comes along with both costs and beneﬁts. Our main normative
result is that the institution of indirect democracy is often preferable to either that of direct
democracy or of delegation of policy making to non-accountable experts, even if the latter are
fully benevolent. Our analysis may help explain why indirect democracy is so prevalent around
the world.
So far, there has been little attempt to incorporate elements of behavioral economics and
bounded rationality into models of voting. Thus, this becomes an important item on the research
agenda in political economy. For instance, Besley (2006) writes “going forward it would be
interesting to understand better what the differences are between behavioral models of politics
and the postulates of strict rationality” (p. 172). By taking into account limitations on voters’
strategic thinking, and by including full rationality as a limit case, we make one step in this
direction.
Our analysis is related to a number of existing studies, most notably Maskin and Tirole
(2004). These authors also analyze the optimality of the three institutions indirect democracy,
direct democracy and independent agents. They consider a binary policy choice where one
policy is more popular among voters than the other. Furthermore, they assume that politicians
are intrinsically motivated to carry out certain policies and their preferences are either congruent
or dissonant to voters. Our analysis differs in three main ways. Technically, we allow policies to
lie on the entire real line. This allows us to conceptualize, in a natural way, notions of imperfect
knowledge about the world, such as the distance of voters’ beliefs from the truth or the noisiness
of a politician’s signal. Second, a key feature of our model is that both voters and politicians
are imperfectly informed about optimal policies. In contrast, Maskin and Tirole assume that
politicians are perfectly informed about which policy is best. Third, we allow for voters’ beliefs
about politicians’ behavioral strategies that are boundedly rational.
Another related study is Canes-Wrone et al. (2001). Their analysis also differs from ours in
several respects. Like Maskin and Tirole, they consider a setup with two states of the world and
two possible policies. In contrast to our study (and to the one of Maskin and Tirole), Canes-
3Wrone et al. do not address the question whether, in the presence of imperfect information,
welfare may be improved by forms of government other than indirect democracy. Furthermore,
they do not allow for boundedly rational beliefs.
Alesina and Tabellini (2007, 2008) provide an in-depth analysis of the advantages and dis-
advantages of accountability. In particular, they compare the performance of a politician who
aims to get reelected with the performance of a bureaucrat who is concerned about his career
perspective. Populism and imperfect knowledge about the world do not play a pivotal role in
their analysis. Schultz (2008) analyzes the welfare effects of accountability by focusing on the
term length of ofﬁce periods. In our study, we take this term length as given.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model of
indirect democracy. In Section 3, we solve the model. In Section 4, we characterize welfare
under indirect democracy. In Section 5, we compare indirect democracy to the case of direct
democracy and to the case of delegation of policy making to non-accountable agents. In Section
6, we discuss our ﬁndings, and we conclude in Section 7. All proofs are in Appendix A.
2 A Model of Indirect Democracy
2.1 Voters
We consider an economy populated by a unit mass of individuals to which we refer as voters.
We consider a setup with two periods, indexed by t = 1;2. In each period, voters’ utility is
determined as




The utility function is identical across voters. The variable gt 2 R denotes a policy action.
Under indirect democracy, gt is set by the ofﬁce-holding politician. Neglecting "t, the utility
maximizing level of gt is given by x
t 2 R. The crucial assumption in our framework is that
x
t is unobserved. We assume that x
t is drawn at the beginning of each period by nature from a
4normal distribution with mean Ex
t and variance 2
x. The mean may vary across periods and is
unknown.
The variable "t is a normally distributed random variable with an expected value of zero
and a variance of 2
". We assume that "t is identically and independently distributed over time
and independent of all other random variables in the model. As is the case for x
t, "t is also
unobserved. The distribution of "t is common knowledge.
As will be spelled out in more detail in Subsection 2.3, nature ﬁrst draws x
t, before "t is
realized. The policy action gt is to be set after x
t has been determined but before "t is realized.
Thus, x
t determines the ex ante optimal policy in period t. It speciﬁes how, from an ex ante
point of view, a choice of gt translates into voters’ utility. In contrast, "t represents a short-term
shock to x
t and determines the ex post optimal level of gt. While x
t and "t are unobserved in
isolation, voters do observe the sum x
t + "t after gt has been set. This allows voters to learn,
although imperfectly, about x
t (see below).









The loss function speciﬁcation is chosen for tractability. This utility function should be taken
as reﬂecting indirect utility, meaning that optimal values of all other choices that voters may
make are already substituted. There are two essential features of (1) or (2). First, x
t determines
a unique interior optimum for gt from an ex ante point of view. Second, there is risk aversion
over the realizations of gt if the latter are uncertain. The main theme of our analysis is voters’
imperfect information about x
t (see below). In order to concentrate on this issue, we make the
simplifying assumption that x
t and, hence, (1) and (2) are common across voters.1
To consider an example, suppose that there is a given budget to be spent for combating
1There are standard examples where heterogeneous voters agree about the optimal level of provision of a public
good. For instance, this is the case in the presence of income heterogeneity when the utility function is of Cobb-
Douglas type with private consumption and a public good as the arguments and with a linear income tax. This is
an important benchmark case (see Atkinson and Stiglitz, p. 302).
5crime. Suppose that the relevant decision is to determine the share of this budget to spend on
preventive measures (schooling, prevention of youth unemployment, quality of neighborhoods
etc.) versus the share to spend on punishment (e.g. prison infrastructures). In this example, x
t
refers to the optimal budget share for preventive measures, given the general current situation
in society. This may refer to the degree of income inequality and ethnic heterogeneity, the
degree to which people follow certain norms, the general level of youth unemployment etc. The
variable "t corresponds to a shock to the “threat of crime” and may originate from a sudden rise
in youth unemployment, a sudden increase in immigration or the like.2
As already stated, x
t is not observed and Ex
t is unknown. However, voters have prior
beliefs about x
t. Speciﬁcally, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 A voter i's prior belief about x
t is given by xi
t which is a normally dis-
tributed random variable with mean i
t and variance 2
x. The distribution of prior beliefs
across voters is common knowledge.
According to Assumption 1, the prior means of xi
t may be heterogeneous among voters
while, for simplicity, we assume that the variance is common across voters.
2.2 Politicians
Under indirect democracy, the policy action gt is chosen and implemented by an incumbent
politician. An incumbent politician’s objective in the ﬁrst ofﬁce period is to maximize the
probability of getting reelected for a second term.3 Conditional on being (re)elected for ofﬁce
in the second period, a politician’s objective is simply to maximize welfare in this period. The
latter assumption is to be understood as a shortcut and does not affect our main conclusions in
2We assume that x
t is normally distributed because of the high tractability of the normal distribution. For
the example of choosing a share of a budget to be spent on preventive measures for combating crime, the policy
variable could only take on values between zero and one. This would not be consistent with a normal distribution.
However, it is straightforward to ﬁnd a transformation of the domain of admissible policies such that they may
take on any real value. Any function that is bijective and maps [ 0;1] onto the entire real line would achieve this.
3One interpretation of this is that he derives ego rents from being in ofﬁce, as in Rogoff (1990) or Besley
(2006).
6a substantive way.4
A politician knows the distribution of voters’ prior beliefs about x
t. However, he does
not directly observe x
t. Rather, a politician receives a signal t that is informative about x
t.
There are two politician types that we dub competent and incompetent, respectively. The prior
probability that a politician is competent is denoted by  and is common knowledge. In case of
the competent politician, t = x
t, i.e. the signal reveals the truth.5 An incompetent politician
receives a noisy signal. Speciﬁcally, in the ﬁrst period, 1 = x
1 + 1, where 1 is a random
variable with mean zero and variance 2
. We dub t an incompetent politician’s bias. In the
second period, 2 = x
2 + 2 in the case of a challenger winning the election. We assume that
t is independent of all random variables in the model and that 2 is independent of 1 and
identically distributed. Furthermore, the distribution of t is common knowledge.
For the case of an incumbent politician we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2 An incompetent incumbent who gets reelected for a second oce period
keeps his bias 1, i.e. 2 = x
2 + 1.
We make Assumption 2 because we ﬁnd it more plausible than assuming that a politician’s bias
is drawn afresh when he gets elected for a second period. In fact, the analysis would be slightly
simpler if we assumed that a politician’s bias is determined anew every period.
In principle, it may be natural to allow for Et 6= 0. One may argue that politicians are
drawn from the general population and may thus have systematically biased views about x
t.
We brieﬂy discuss this case in Appendix C but do not consider it in the main model since it
complicates the analysis without leading to substantive additional insights.6
We make two further assumptions about a politician’s information. First, we follow the
literature on career concerns by assuming that a politician does not observe his own type (see
4In particular, we may allow for rent seeking along the lines of a model discussed in Persson and Tabellini
(2000, Ch. 4). See footnote 10 below. We exclude rent seeking here in the interest of transparency.
5The assumption that the competent politician perfectly observes x
t is made for simplicity. The main conclu-
sions from our analysis could also be obtained if the competent type received a more informative, but imperfect,
signal than the incompetent type, as, for instance, in the career concerns model of Prat (2005).
6Whether politicians should be understood as a “representative sample” drawn from the general population
clearly depends on the nature of the political recruitment process and may differ across countries.
7Holmstr¨ om, 1999, and Prat, 2005). This means that he does not observe whether his signal is
perfect or noisy. Second, we make the simplifying assumption that a politician treats his signal
t as a best predictor for x
t. To state this formally, assume that a politician’s belief about the
ex ante optimal policy x
t is captured by a random variable x
p
t. The superscript is an index for
politicians. We then state the mentioned assumptions as follows.
Assumption 3 A politician does not observe his type. He believes that E [x
p
t jt] = t.
We make the additional simplifying assumption that a politician takes t as a “point esti-
mate” for x
t in the sense of classical statistics and his behavior is only based on this point
estimate (rather than on a non-degenerate belief x
p
t). We make this assumption only for sim-
plicity and discuss its relaxation in Appendix D. In practical terms, t should be interpreted as a
policy suggestion that a politician gets from his advisers or his party. Thus, a politician’s com-
petence is not only determined by his personal skills but also by the competence of his advisers
and party strategists.
2.3 The Political Game
Below we indicate the stages of the political game in a more formal manner. We provide a label
for each stage of the game. The letters in the labels refer to the players which have their moves
at the respective stages. N denotes nature, P denotes the politician, and V denotes voters. The
ﬁrst ﬁgure after the letter refers to the ofﬁce period t = 1;2. The second ﬁgure indexes moves
within an ofﬁce period for nature, as nature has two moves within one period.
 Stage N1.1: Nature draws x
1; it determines the type of the incumbent politician and his
signal 1.
 Stage P1: The incumbent politician chooses g1.
 Stage N1.2: Nature draws "1 and sends the signal x
1 + "1 to voters.
8 Stage V1: Voters decide whether to reelect or oust the incumbent politician.
 Stage N2.1: Nature draws x
2; if a new politician is in ofﬁce, nature determines his type
and, in case of an incompetent politician, his bias 2; furthermore, nature sends the signal
2.
 Stage P2: The politician chooses g2.
 Stage N2.2: Nature draws "2.
Politicianshavetwomovesintheabovegame, sincetheysetgt ineachperiod. Thepolitician
in period 2 may be different from the politician in ofﬁce in period 1. Voters have only one move
in the entire game, i.e. they decide whether to cast their votes for the incumbent politician or
for a challenger.
Our model is comparatively rich. This is due to the fact that, unlike the existing literature,
our model incorporates the feature that both voters and politicians are imperfectly informed
about what policy is optimal. Furthermore, the problem under study is only of interest if we
allow for the possibility that voters have an opportunity to learn about x
t, but imperfectly so.
This motivates the inclusion of the random variable "t. There is no other more parsimonious
setup where we can still analyze the role of imperfect information in politics on both the voters’
and the politicians’ side in a meaningful way.
3 Analysis of Indirect Democracy
3.1 Overview
The logic of our derivation of the solution of the political game as stated in Section 2.3 is
as follows. The two crucial stages of the game are V1 and P1. In an equilibrium, voters’
reelection decisions and an incumbent’s choice of g1 must be mutually best responses, given
voters’ beliefs. Furthermore, an equilibrium entails that voters’ beliefs at stage V1 integrate the
9information contained in nature’s signal at stage N1.2 and the information contained in g1 about
a politician’s type and bias according to Bayes’ law.
For the derivation of the equilibrium it is convenient to start with voters, taking as given a
(well-behaved) belief of voters about how an incumbent politician sets g1 as a function of his
signal 1. Given this belief and voters’ posterior information about the ex ante optimal policy
level x
1 and the incumbent politician’s type and bias, voters determine their expected utility
from reelecting the incumbent politician. They compare this level of expected utility to the one
resulting from ousting the incumbent politician and electing a challenger. Our analysis focuses
on the case where the pivotal voter is the one associated with median of i
1.7
The pivotal voter’s reelection decision implies an incumbent politician’s best response. It
is crucial to understand, however, that we will ﬁrst derive voters’ reelection decisions for given
beliefs about how a politician sets g1 as a function of his signal 1. An equilibrium requires
voters’ beliefs about an incumbent’s behavior and a politician’s actual behavior being mutually
related, if not identical. We use a speciﬁc equilibrium concept that is based on what we dub
beliefs of sophistication of degree k. These beliefs contain an element of bounded rationality
concerning voters’ strategic thinking. The case of full rationality where voters’ beliefs coincide
with a politician’s actual behavior is contained as a limit case and gives rise to a standard
sequential equilibrium.
Our main results will be intuitive. However, deriving them in a rigorous manner requires
indeed a careful consideration of the role of voters’ beliefs about a politician’s behavior. Thus,
the derivation is more intricate than one may infer at ﬁrst, when simply looking at the results.
3.2 Voters’ Beliefs
In this subsection we characterize voters’ sequentially rational beliefs at stage V1 of the game:
(i)abouttheexanteoptimalpolicylevelx
1; (ii)abouttheincumbent’sbias1 conditionalonthe
incumbent being incompetent; and (iii) about the probability that the incumbent is competent.
7See Appendix B for conditions that guarantee that the voter associated with the median of i
1 is pivotal.
10We start with posterior beliefs about x
1. These result from observing x
1 + "1 at stage N1.2 of
the game. Although the ex post optimal policy level is given by x
1 + "1, rational voters are
interested in the ex ante optimal level x
1 since they want to judge a politician’s competence and
are aware that a politician chooses g1 before "1 is realized.
Concerning notation, we use a hat for all variables that are associated with voters’ posterior
beliefs (i.e. beliefs at stage V1). Variables without a hat refer to prior beliefs. The following
lemma states a standard result for normally distributed beliefs.
Lemma 1 (Posterior beliefs about x
1) Voter i's posterior belief ^ xi
1 about the ex ante
optimal policy level x
1 is normally distributed with mean ^ i
1 = (1   )i
1+ (x














Lemma 1 characterizes voters’ posterior beliefs about the ex ante optimal policy level x
1.
The assumption of normally distributed prior beliefs xi
1 implies that the posterior mean ^ i
1 is a
weighted average of the prior mean and the signal x
1 + "1, observed at stage N1.2 of the game.






While the result in Lemma 1 is highly standard, it is useful to explain its meaning in the
context of the current analysis. Consider again the example of what share of a given budget to
spend on preventive measures to combat crime. Ex ante, the optimal share is given by x
1 and
voter i believes that expected welfare is maximized by setting g1 = i
1. Ex post, voters observe
the ex post optimal budget share for preventive measures x
1 + "1. The latter depends on the
actual ex post threat of crime according to random short-term factors constituting "1. If 2
" is
very low, then observing x
1 + "1 is very informative about x
1 and voters will put a high weight
on the signal. In contrast, if 2
" is high, voters update their beliefs only in a minor way.
Consider a voter who believes that a high share of the budget to combat crime should be
spent on punishment and that the actual share spent on punishment has indeed been high. Sup-
pose that, ex post, the crime rate is high. If 2
" were low, then the voter would infer that his prior
beliefs were probably wrong. But if 2
" is high, he will conclude that criminal threat must have
been unusually high.
11As a special case, voters’ prior beliefs may be understood as ideologies, e.g. about the
desirability of punishment for combating crime. An important characteristic of ideologies is
that they are persistent, i.e. people are not willing to let their ideologies “erode” (B´ enabou,
2008). In light of the above discussion, ideological beliefs have the same effects as assuming
that 2
" is very high. In this case, voters blame "1 for any observation that is at variance with
their beliefs.
We now turn to voters’s posterior beliefs about the realization of the incumbent politician’s
bias 1, conditional on the incumbent being incompetent. (For the competent type, we have
1  0.) We denote the posterior belief about the realization of the bias 1 by ^ i
1. As indicated
by the notation, this posterior belief is heterogeneous since it depends on heterogeneous beliefs
xi
1 (or ^ xi
1). The reason why a rational voter wants to updated his beliefs about 1 is that an
incompetent incumbent who gets reelected for the second ofﬁce period will keep his bias as
stated in Assumption 2. Thus, a voter i uses ^ i
1 for determining expected utility in the second
period in case of reelection of the incumbent (see Section 3.3 below).
In order to characterize the belief ^ i
1, we need to introduce a belief of voters about how a
politician sets g1 as a function of his signal 1. As outlined in Subsection 3.1, we defer the
precise speciﬁcation of this belief to later (see Section 3.5). Until there, we simply use an
abstract notation for this belief and assume that voters believe that g1 = G(1). In technical
terms, G represents voters’ belief about a politician’s behavioral strategy. In order to update
beliefs about 1, voters’ need to infer a politician’s unobserved signal 1 from the observed
policy choice g1. We guess (and verify later) that G is continuous and strictly increasing. This
assures that the inverse function of G, denoted by G 1, exists. Thus, voters simply use this
inverse G 1 to infer the unobserved signal 1 from the observed action g1.
Some further comments about the belief G are in order. First, the fact that G is a continuous
and strictly increasing function implies that a politician’s behavioral strategy is strictly separat-
ing across signals. That means that voters believe that if there were two politicians that received
different signals, then they would choose different levels of g1. Second, we assume that the
12belief G is identical across voters. Third, the function G will be made speciﬁc in Section 3.5.
Under the speciﬁc class of beliefs that we consider there, it will turn out that G is linear and
strictly increasing.8 Thus, our assumption that G is continuous and strictly increasing turns
out to be consistent. Finally, we do not require that the belief G is a priori correct. Thus, the
inferred signal G 1 (g1) may deviate from the actual signal 1 that the incumbent politician has
received. Our notation indicates this by using a hat for the signal as inferred by voters through
their belief G. Thus, we have ^ 1 = G 1 (g1).
Voteriexpectsthat, conditionalontheincumbentpoliticianbeingincompetent, ^ 1 = ^ xi
1+1.
It follows that ^ 1 serves as a signal that a voter i uses to update his beliefs about the realization
of the politician’s bias 1, using his posterior belief about x
1 (see Lemma 1).9 We then have
the following result.
Lemma 2 (Posterior beliefs about 1) Voter i's posterior belief ^ i
1 about the realiza-
tion of the incumbent's bias 1 is normally distributed with mean E^ i
1 = 


















The proof is almost identical to the one of Lemma 1 and is omitted. Note that in the case where
^ 1 = ^ i
1, we have E^ i
1 = 0. However, since 1 is normally distributed, ^ 1 = ^ i
1 occurs with
probability zero. As a result, we generically have E^ i
1 6= 0.
We ﬁnally determine a voter’s posterior belief about the probability that the incumbent
politician is competent. Conditional on the incumbent being competent, voter i treats ^ 1 as
drawn from the distribution ^ xi
1. Similarly, conditional on the incumbent being incompetent, the
voter treats ^ 1 as drawn from ^ xi
1 + ^ 1. Denote by fi
c the density function associated with ^ xi
1, and
by fi
ic the density function associated with ^ xi
1 + ^ i
1. The subscripts c and ic stand for competent
and incompetent, respectively. Using this notation, the posterior probability that the incumbent
politician is competent is determined as follows.
8The linearity follows from the fact that ^ i
1 is linear in x
1 according to Lemma 1.
9Note that it would not be rational to use the prior belief about x
1 since this would mean neglecting useful
information.
13Lemma 3 (Posterior ) (i): Voter i's posterior belief about the probability that the




















(ii): ^ i is a strictly decreasing function of
 















would denote the probabilities that 1 takes on its inferred value in the
case of the competent and the incompetent politician, respectively. Thus, (3) would reﬂect a
standard updating formula. Lemma 3 shows that the same logic applies if fc and fic refer to
continuous random variables, provided they are well-behaved as it is true for normal random
variables.
Part (ii) of Lemma 3 will be used for deriving a politician’s best-response choice of g1
below. It shows that the larger the distance between a politician’s signal ^ 1 (as inferred by the
voter) and his posterior belief ^ i
1, the lower the probability that the voter assigns to the event
that the incumbent politician is competent. This manifests how a voter judges the competence
of an incumbent politician through the lens of his (posterior) belief.
3.3 Voters’ Reelection Decision
The politician in ofﬁce in the second period is either the incumbent from the ﬁrst period or a
newly elected challenger. In either case, he sets g2 = 2 at stage P2 of the game. This follows
from our assumption that, conditional on being reelected, a politician’s objective is to maximize
welfare10 and from Assumption 3.
10The aim of this assumption is to simplify the analysis. We could obtain almost identical results if we were
allowing for rent extraction in a way similar to Persson and Tabellini (2000, Ch. 4.5). To see this, suppose that there
is an upper bound on the amount of rents that a politician can extract. Suppose further that a competent politician
makes better use of the remaining government budget by better promoting welfare due to superior information (see
Rogoff, 1990). In such a model, rent seeking would not affect a politician’s choice of gt.
14We consider now a voter i’s reelection decision at stage V1 of the game. A voter i considers
his expected utility in case of reelection of the incumbent and compares it to the expected utility
obtained in case of the election of a challenger. He casts his vote for the incumbent if and only if
expected utility his higher under the incumbent than under the challenger. There is no strategic
voting since there is a continuous population of voters.
Expected utility in the case of reelection of the incumbent is determined as follows. From
the perspective of voter i, the incumbent is competent with probability ^ i (see Lemma 3). In
the case of the competent incumbent, g2 = x
2 since 2 = x
2. Voter i does not observe x
2
but substitutes his belief xi
2. Using (2), EV i




". In case that the
incumbent is incompetent, g2 = 2 = xi
2 + ^ i
1, according to Assumption 2 and Lemma 2. Using




































The logic behind (4) is that the utility loss due to the variance of "1 is realized for both politician
types. In contrast, the loss due to the fact that an incompetent politician’s signal is noisy arises
only with probability 1   ^ i from the perspective of voter i.
Expected utility from a challenger is determined very similarly. There ^ i has to be replaced
by  and ^ i





"   (1   )
2
: (5)
A voter reelects the incumbent if and only if expected utility as given by (4) exceeds expected
utility as given by (5). Rearranging directly leads to the condition stated in the below lemma.
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15Lemma 4 (Reelection Decision) Voter i reelects the incumbent if and only if











To understand condition (6), consider ﬁrst the limit case in which a voter would not learn
anything about the incumbent’s bias 1 from observing the incumbent’s action at stage P1. This
would be the case if the function G were constant for all levels of the signal 1. In this case,
E^ i
1 = E1 = 0 and ^ 2
 = 2
. Thus, condition (6) simpliﬁes to ^ i  . This means that a voter
casts his ballot for the incumbent if and only if it is more likely that the incumbent is competent
than that a challenger is competent.
If voters update their beliefs about an incumbent’s bias 1 by observing g1 at stage P1,
reelection of the incumbent is compatible with ^ i < . Thus, it is possible that a voter prefers
to reelect an incumbent politician even if he believes that the probability that the incumbent is
competent is lower than the probability that a challenger would be competent. Lemma 4 shows






 is sufﬁciently smaller than 2
. This is the case if
  ^ 1   ^ i
1
  
is small and g1 provides a relatively sharp signal about the incumbent’s bias 1, such that ^ 2

is small (see Lemma 2). In this case, reelecting the incumbent, a voter expects a relatively
small variance associated with g2 relative to the variance associated with g2 when being set by
a challenger. This comes at a beneﬁt since voters are risk averse over g2.
3.4 Politician Behavior
A politician’s behavior at stage P2 has already been discussed at the beginning of last subsec-
tion. At stage P1, a politician chooses g1 such that he maximizes the probability of getting
reelected. This entails maximizing the probability that (6) holds for the median voter, i.e. the
voter associated with the median of i
1, denoted by m
1 . (See Appendix B for a discussion of
sufﬁcient conditions for the voter associated with m
1 being pivotal.)
From Lemma 3(ii), ^ m strictly decreases in
 
^ 1   ^ m
1
 






  ^ 1   ^ m
1
  . It follows that a politician maximizes the probability
that (6) holds for the median voter by setting g1 such that ^ 1 = E [^ m
1 j1], since this max-





. A politician determines ^ 1 via his choice of g1 since
^ 1 = G 1 (g1). Using this, it follows that the condition ^ 1 = E [^ m
1 j1] is equivalent to
g1 = G(E [^ m
1 j1]). Substituting for E [^ m
1 j1] from Lemma 1 and using Assumption 3, we
state this as follows.
Lemma 5 (Politician's Behavior) The incumbent politician chooses g1 = G((1   )m
1 + 1).
This lemma establishes that, given voters’ belief G about a politician’s behavioral strategy,
setting g1 = G((1   )m
1 + 1) is a best response to this belief and to voters’ reelection
decision as characterized by (6).
3.5 Strategic Beliefs of Sophistication of Degree k
Lemmas 4 and 5 characterize mutually best responses for voter’s election decisions at stage V1
of the game and a politician’s choice of g1 at stage P1. These mutually best responses have
been derived under the assumption that voters’ have a belief G about how a politician sets g1 as
a function of his signal 1. We have assumed that G is a strictly increasing function of 1 and is
common across voters.
A full solution of the game requires determining G such that it relates to a politician’s
actual behavioral strategy as characterized in Lemma 5. We concentrate on what we dub beliefs
of strategic sophistication of level k, or sophistication-k beliefs, for short. Sophistication-k
beliefs are related to the cognitive hierarchy model of Camerer et al. (2004). They contain an
element of bounded rationality, but full rationality is obtained as a limit case. In the case of
bounded rationality, voters’ beliefs about a politician’s behavioral strategy G and a politician’s
actual behavioral strategy are mutually consistent up to one order. The precise meaning of this
statement will become clear below.
17From a technical point of view, we develop sophistication-k beliefs recursively. We start
with a baseline belief about how a politician sets g1 as a function of 1. This baseline belief
corresponds, by deﬁnition, to a belief of strategic sophistication of degree zero. A natural
choice of the baseline belief is the one where voters believe that a politician maximizes expected
welfare, given his signal 1. Denoting this baseline belief by G0 (1), it entails that G0 (1) = 1.
This follows from (2) and Assumption 3.
Consider now a politician’s best response to the belief G0. Using Lemma 5, it follows that
a politician maximizes the probability of getting reelected by choosing g1 = G0 [E [^ m
1 j1]] =
(1   )m
1 + 1. It follows that a politician’s best response deviates from voters’ belief.
The intuition for this fact is as follows. Suppose that the median voter believes that a politi-
cian chooses g1 = 1. This implies that, at stage V1, the median voter judges an incumbent
competent if g1 comes close to ^ m
1 . In other words, the median voter judges competence through
the lens of his posterior belief about x
1, i.e. ^ m
1 . A politician anticipating this has an incentive
to set g1 equal to his expectation of ^ m
1 , i.e. E [^ m
1 j1], rather than equal to 1. Using Lemma 1
and Assumption 3, if follows that E [^ m
1 j1] = (1   )m
1 + 1.
By deﬁnition, a belief of strategic sophistication of degree 1 entails that voters antici-
pate a politician’s incentive to deviate from the sophistication-0 belief G0. Thus, G1 (1) :=
G0 ((1   )m
1 + 1) = (1   )m
1 + 1 (since G0 (1) = 1). A politician’s best re-
sponse to this belief is again determined by Lemma 5 and we obtain g1 = G1 [E [^ m
1 j1]] =
(1   2)m
1 +21 6= G1 (1). Thus, apoliticianalsohasanincentivetodeviatefromsophistication-
1 beliefs. Proceeding with this recursion, we deﬁne sophistication-k beliefs as follows.
Denition 1 Beliefs of strategic sophistication of degree k are dened by the recursion
Gk (1) = Gk 1 ((1   )
m
1 + 1); (7)
where G0 (1) = 1.
The following Lemma provides a direct analytical expression for Gk and states a politician’s
18best response to this belief. The proof is straightforward and is omitted.
Lemma 6 Under beliefs of sophistication of degree k, voter i's belief about a politician's




1 + 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Conﬁrming our earlier claim, Gk is indeed linear. Furthermore, it is strictly increasing in 1
for ﬁnite k. Hence, ^ 1 = G 1 (g1) is well-deﬁned for ﬁnite k. The solution of the political game
for inﬁnite k is obtained as a limit case.
Under sophistication-k beliefs, voters’ beliefs about a politician’s behavioral strategy and a
politician’s actual behavioral strategy are mutually consistent up to one order. Both converge
when k approaches inﬁnity. We do not restrict the analysis to this limit case since, in our view, it
is not particularly realistic. Rather, our approach is to take k as exogenously given and identical
across voters. We take it as a constraint on the sophistication of voters’ strategic thinking.
Alternatively, it may also be interpreted as a belief of voters about the strategic sophistication
of the incumbent politician. The evidence discussed in Camerer et al. (2004) suggests that
experimental subjects are able to foresee about one or two rounds of strategic reactions. This
stands in sharp contrast to the requirement of unlimited rationality of anticipating strategic
reactions for inﬁnitely many rounds. Thinking about the chess game makes it salient how
difﬁcult it is in practice to anticipate higher-order strategic reactions of other players.
In practice, k may be inﬂuenced by many factors. One factor may be the structure of the
media market, e.g. to what degree the market for TV news is dominated by a public provider
(see Prat and Str¨ omberg, 2006). One may speculate that private news provider have a greater in-
centive to present “stories” where politicians are portrayed as strategic actors that do everything
only to get reelected. This may increase voters’ level of k, in turn.
3.6 The Political Equilibrium
We start the discussion of the equilibrium with a deﬁnition of populism.
19Denition 2 (Populism) A politician's choice is populist if it does not only depend on
his signal t but also on the prior belief of the median voter m
t .
Our main positive result, which characterizes the outcomes in an indirect democracy in the
ﬁrst ofﬁce period, is the following.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium First Period) Suppose voters hold beliefs of degree of





















1 + 1) (9)
in case of the incompetent politician. (ii): If k is innite, there exists a unique equilibrium
that is obtained as a limit case for k ! 1. Then both politician types set g1 = m
1 .
Part (i) of Proposition 1 shows that g1 is equal to a weighted average of the politician’s
signal about x
1 and the median voter’s prior belief about x
1. Remember that the signal of the
competent politician is equal to x
1 while the signal of the incompetent politician is equal to
x
1 + 1. Any equilibrium involves pandering to the median voter’s belief and thus a populist
policy choice. The degree to which policy making is populist is the higher, the lower k. In
the limit case where k = 1, (part (ii) of Proposition 1), policy making is perfectly populist
and neither politician type makes use of his signal. Thus, k can be understood as indicating
the susceptibility to populism. Since 0 <  < 1, a higher k implies a higher susceptibility to
populism. We discuss the intuition for this result below.
In the case of a ﬁnite k, the prevailing equilibrium is separating. This means that: (i) a
politician’s choice depends on his signal 1 and different values of the signal lead to different
policy choices; (ii) both politician types choose different levels of g1 with probability one.
20The difference in policy choices shrinks with a higher level of k. For the limit case of full-
rationality, i.e. an inﬁnite k, the prevailing equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium. In particular,
both politician types choose an identical policy action that does not depend on the signal 1.
A crucial determinant of  is 2
" (see Lemma 1). If 2
" is low,  is close to one and populism
vanishes. To understand this, recall that voters receive the signal x
1 + "1 before making their
election decision. They use this signal to judge an incumbent politician’s competence. If 2
"
is very low, voters observe the ex ante optimal policy level, i.e. x
1, almost perfectly, and they
know it. As a result of getting a very precise signal, the median voter’s prior m
1 has very little
inﬂuence on his posterior belief about x
1. A politician’s aim is to be judged competent through
the lens of the median voter’s posterior belief. If this posterior belief depends only very little
on the prior m
1 , a politician’s incentive to pander to the median voter’s prior belief is low. As
a result, the policy is almost exclusively determined by the politician’s signal that he uses to
predict the median voter’s posterior belief.
In the opposite case, where 2
" is large,  is low. Thus, voters’ beliefs are highly persistent
and m
1 has a high weight in inﬂuencing policy. A high 2
" has the same effect as ideological
beliefs about x
1, which voters may be motivated to keep intact (B´ enabou, 2008).
The result that a higher k leads to more populism seems rather surprising at ﬁrst. Its logic is
best understood from a formal point of view. Consider the limit case where k is inﬁnite. Then, it
is in fact a logical impossibility that g1 can depend on 1 in equilibrium. To see this, suppose that
g1 would indeed depend on 1. Then voters would be aware of this and would also understand
that 1 = x
1 in the case of the competent politician. However, they do not observe x
1 and voter
i substitutes ^ i
1 for x
1. Thus, a politician who wants to appear competent to the median voter
will not actually want to let his policy depend on 1 but rather on E [^ m
1 j1] = (1   )m
1 +1
(see Lemma 1 and Assumption 3). Here 1 enters only with a weight , which lies between zero
and one. But now g1 would still depend on 1, hence the same argument can be repeated and
we would ﬁnd that g1 could in fact only depend on (1   2)m
1 + 21. This argument can be
iterated an inﬁnite number of time. Since 0 <  < 1, 1 must necessarily vanish and g1 cannot
21depend on 1. If k is ﬁnite, then this argument can be repeated only a ﬁnite number of times
that increases with k. With each iteration, g1 depends less on 1 and more on m
1 .
We conclude this section by summarizing the equilibrium outcome in the second period.
The result follows directly from the discussion at the beginning of Section 3.3.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium Second Period) In the second oce period, we have
g2 = x
2 in case of a competent politician. Furthermore, g2 = x
2 + 1 in case of a re-
elected incompetent politician and g2 = x
2 + 2 in case of an incompetent challenger.
4 The Costs and Beneﬁts of Populist Policies
Using Proposition 1 and 2, it is straightforward to characterize welfare under indirect democ-




period t. Lt is deﬁned as the difference between expected utility as achieved when gt is set to
its ex ante welfare-maximizing level x
t and expected utility as achieved in the equilibrium of
the political game. The ﬁrst-best utility value ex ante results if gt = x























2 = [1      ]
2
; (11)
where   0.
Consider the ﬁrst period. The welfare loss from indirect democracy is equal to a weighted
average of the distortion associated with the median voter’s belief and the variance of the in-
competent politician’s bias. The ﬁrst term arises from pandering. The second term arises from
22the fact that no equilibrium for ﬁnite k entails full pandering. Politicians will always partially
base their policy choice upon their signal 1. This follows from the fact that voters observe
x
1 + "1 before they make their reelection decision. Anticipating this induces the incumbent
politician to not fully ignore his signal. Since the signal of the incompetent politician is noisy,
the fact that g1 depends on this signal increases the variance of g1. This comes at a cost to risk
averse voters. Note that the weights
 
1   k+12 and 2(k+1) do not add to one. We will come
back to this in the next section.
It follows from Proposition 3 that there are both costs and beneﬁts to populist policies. The
costs relate to the fact that the competent politician partially ignores his signal. Since the signal
reveals the ex ante optimal policy level, this means wasting useful information. On the other
hand, populism also leads the incompetent politician to partially ignore his signal. This comes
at a beneﬁt to risk averse voters and prevents policy making from being too erratic. The key
insight from this result is that populism can have beneﬁcial consequences in a world where both
voters and policy makers are imperfectly informed. This is a crucial insight for judging the
beneﬁts of indirect democracy.
In the second period, populism does not arise since no politician has an incentive to manip-
ulate voters’ perception of his competence. As a result, only the noise term 2
 contributes to
the welfare loss. It can be checked that   0 follows from the fact that the probability that
a competent politician holds ofﬁce in the second period exceeds  (see the proof of Proposi-
tion 3). Thus, the probability that a competent politician holds ofﬁce in the second period is
higher than that a competent politician holds ofﬁce in the ﬁrst period. This means that an elec-
tion leads to a screening of competent politicians, even though voters are imperfectly informed
about the optimal policy. The reason is that a competent politician is better at predicting the
median voter’s posterior belief about the optimal policy. As a result, the coefﬁcient of 2
 in
(11) is smaller than 1   , which appears in the coefﬁcient of 2
 in (10).12
12Of course, it must be the case that 1        0. This requires, in particular, that  = 0 if  = 1. It can
be inferred from the proof of Proposition 3 that this is indeed the case.
235 Comparing Constitutional Regimes
Now we turn to the question, which constitutional regime is optimal if voters are imperfectly
informed about the world and politicians and other agents may be so, too. We analyze this
question according to the degree of delegation of decision making from voters to their agents
in three constitutional regimes. Decision making can either be delegated to completely inde-
pendent agents such as experts, or to politicians who want to get reelected and, thus, are only
partially independent (indirect democracy), or it may not be delegated at all (direct democ-
racy).13 The question we address now is which of these regimes leads to higher welfare under
what circumstances?
We ﬁrst consider direct democracy. We follow Maskin and Tirole (2004) by modeling direct
democracy as a political institution where gt = m
t , i.e. it is the median voter who directly
chooses gt. The idea is that in a direct democracy voters have the right to ask for referenda and
that this would lead to a strong link between policy making and the beliefs of the median voter.14
In this simple benchmark model of direct democracy the median voter is the only relevant actor
and there are no strategic elements involved. The following proposition follows directly from
inserting gt into (2) and taking expectations.






The loss function is again deﬁned as the deviation of expected utility from its ﬁrst-best level.
Before we compare this to the case of indirect democracy, we introduce the third institution
that we consider here: delegation of policy making to independent agents. In the following, we
will dub these agents experts, as this reﬂects more accurately what we have in mind.
In order to facilitate the comparison to indirect democracy, our assumptions about experts
parallel our assumptions about politicians. In particular, we also assume that there are two types
13Relating to Maskin and Tirole (2004), the higher the degree of delegation of decision making the lower the
accountability of decision makers in a constitutional regime.
14In New Zealand, Switzerland, and some U.S. states, a referendum can be initiated by voters by means of a
citizen petition.
24of experts, competent and incompetent. Exactly as in the case of politicians, we assume that the
experts receive a signal, denoted e
t, about x
t. For the competent expert we have e
t = x
t while,
for the incompetent expert, we have e
t = x
t + t. The random variable t reﬂects a noise term
with an expected value of zero and a variance 2
. The probability that an expert is competent is
. By deﬁnition, experts as non-accountable agents conduct policy for both periods and cannot
be ﬁred after the ﬁrst period.
The term “incompetent expert” may sound rather odd at ﬁrst. What we have in mind is that
if experts disagree, at most one expert opinion can be right. Thus, experts may be wrong even if
they are highly trained. Combating crime provides one salient example where experts disagree
substantially (see Levitt, 1998, and Buscaglia, 2008), climate change provides another one (see
McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2002; Weitzman, 2007; Stern 2008).
In one important aspect, our assumptions about experts deviate from the assumptions made
about politicians. We assume that experts are fully benevolent. Thus, they set gt = e
t. We
make this assumption since the case of benevolent experts is often considered as an ideal, if
unfeasible, benchmark for government. Here we are interested in the question under which
conditions this ideal benchmark would actually be desirable in a world of imperfect knowledge.
The welfare loss under the expert system is given in the following proposition. The proof is
very similar to the one of Proposition 3 and is omitted.




We are now in a position to compare the three political institutions. We start the discussion
by noting that, concerning the ﬁrst period, indirect democracy can be understood as a mix of
direct democracy and governance by non-accountable experts. To see this, denote 
p
1 the signal
of a politician and assume that e
1 = 
p
1  . Furthermore, assume that the likelihood that an
expert or a politician is incompetent is equal, i.e.  = . Then gEXP
1 = , where EXP stands
for experts. Furthermore, gDD
1 = m
1 , where DD refers to direct democracy. From Proposition






1 , where ID refers to indirect democracy.




















that L1 is strictly convex. The fact that the loss associated with gID
1 is lower than a weighted
average of the losses associated with either gDD
1 or gEXP
1 is also the reason why the weights
associated with the two terms in LID
1 in Proposition 3, namely
 
1   k+12 and 2(k+1), add to
less than one for ﬁnite k. We summarize this ﬁnding in a corollary.






























Comparing the loss functions in Propositions 3, 4, and 5, the elements that crucially affect
which constitutional regime is optimal are: The distortion associated with the median voter’s
belief, i.e. jm
t   x
tj; the variance of the incompetent politician’s bias, i.e. 2
; and the corre-
sponding variance of the incompetent expert’s bias, i.e. 2
. We discuss the implications of our
analysis in the next section. In the following corollary, we simply point out the comparative
statics.
Corollary 2 (Constitutional Comparison) (i): Non-accountable experts are optimal
if 2
 is small relative to jm
t   x
tj and 2
. (ii): Direct democracy is optimal if jm
t   x
tj
is small relative to 2
 and 2
. (iii): In case that neither of these conditions applies, the
weighted-average nature of indirect democracy may often make it optimal.
6 Discussion
We ﬁrst provide arguments why the variance of the noise of experts’ signal 2
 may not be small
in many cases. This leads us to the conclusion that delegation to experts may not be optimal in
many domains. We proceed by discussing the relative merits of direct and indirect democracy.
Our conclusion is that the latter may be optimal in many instances.
26The noise of experts’ signal 2
 reﬂects the degree to which experts can draw on reliable
knowledge that has been derived from a large amount of high-quality data. An example of a
piece of knowledge associated with a very low 2
 would be “HIV causes AIDS.”
The desirability of many policies depends on behavioral reactions to certain interventions,
e.g. the reactions of criminal activities to more severe punishment, or the reactions of labor
supply to a ﬁve-percent increase in the income tax. Unfortunately, there are few examples
where social scientists can draw upon high quality data in order to pin down the consequences
to a policy intervention with a high degree of precision. This is a consequence of the fact that it
is rarely possible to conduct large-scale randomized experiments that would allow for collecting
high quality data.15 Second, many policy interventions have a unique element in that they are
carried out for the ﬁrst time or for the ﬁrst time under certain circumstances.
In contrast, 2
 is low and hence delegation to experts desirable in domains where choosing
the right policy is simply a matter of applying technical knowledge. Here, we come to the
same conclusions as Maskin and Tirole (2004), and Alesina and Tabellini (2007, 2008). As
an example, we mention the calculation of an annuity conversion factor for a public pension
system as a function of life expectancies. Central banking may be another important case.
Overall, 2
 is unlikely to be small in many important cases. In line with this observa-
tion, there are many examples where experts widely disagree (e.g. combating crime or climate
change; see references above). In these cases, it is conceivable that the median voter’s prior
belief lies somewhere in between the “signals” of various experts.
Now we turn to the comparison of direct and indirect democracy. Our analysis implies that
direct democracy is desirable if the distortion of the median voter’s prior jm
t   x
tj is small.
This term may indeed be small in some circumstances and large in others. It is expected to
be small when judging the effect of a policy does not so much require formal knowledge but
rather a good “feeling” about what would be an appropriate policy action and what the likely
behavioral reactions are. Second, in some cases, voters may actually have more information
15See Banerjee and Duﬂo (2008) for a discussion.
27than politicians (and experts). An example for the former case may be a judgment about how
much free choice of savings and investment strategies there should be in a pension system.
Ordinary voters may be better able to judge how easy or difﬁcult it may be for them to make
such choices themselves than politicians (and experts). An example for the latter case may
be combating crime in local neighborhoods where residents of such neighborhoods may have
superior information. In both cases, jm
t   x
tj may be small relative to 2
 and 2
.
In other instances, judging the desirability of a policy may require more formal knowledge.
An important example may be globalization, although even here ordinary workers may have
some additional information about how they are affected by globalization in the short-run that
is not readily available to politicians and experts. To the degree that formal knowledge is im-
portant for judging policies, politicians have greater incentives to acquire this knowledge than
voters (Maskin and Tirole, 2004). The reason is that the latter may anticipate that they are not
pivotal and thus not invest in the acquisition of this formal knowledge. This makes the case
for delegating policy making to politicians. On the other hand, there is the danger that politi-
cians are incompetent or may lack important informal information as discussed above. This is
reﬂected in the parameter 2
. This is where the positive effects of “populism” come into play:
politicians are induced not to rely exclusively on their signal but to incorporate voters’ beliefs.
Our main positive result in this paper is that policies under indirect democracy are deter-
mined as a weighted average of voters’ priors and politicians’ signals. This weighted average
nature makes indirect democracy a very balanced and well-diversiﬁed institution, which is de-
sirable from a normative point of view. Our analysis may help to explain why it is so prevalent
around the world.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed policy making under indirect democracy. The key innovation
of our setup is that we take into account that both voters and politicians may be imperfectly
28informed about what policies are desirable. Our main positive result is that policies under
indirect democracy are a weighted average of voters’ prior beliefs and politicians’ signals. This
implies our main normative result that, due to its balanced nature, indirect democracy should
often be expected to be preferable to either direct democracy or delegation to non-accountable
agents.
These results crucially depend on the two effects of populism, a generic characteristic of
indirect democracy. Just as suggested by the entry quote of Winston Churchill, populism comes
at a cost because the reelection goal of competent politicians lets them partly neglect useful
information about optimal policies. In contrast, the same objective restrains incompetent politi-
cians from implementing their erratic ideas one by one. This good side of populism has not
been identiﬁed in the literature before and is due to our assumption that politicians (and even
experts) can err, too.
Although our ﬁndings are intuitive, their derivation requires a careful consideration of vot-
ers’ beliefs about how politicians make use of their information when they choose a policy.
Working out the role of these beliefs is another main contribution of our analysis.
There is a range of issues to be addressed in future research. First, one may generalize the
model to an indeﬁnite time horizon, where each politician may serve in ofﬁce for two or more
consecutive periods. Second, it would be interesting to consider the case where a policy affects
welfare of different subgroups of the population in different ways. Third, it would also be im-
portant to explore which forms of indirect democracy may be most desirable, either presidential
or parliamentary, majoritarian or proportional. Fourth, it would be interesting to consider the
role of the media in shaping voters’ beliefs. Finally, the setup of this paper may also apply to
decision making in corporations.
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Voters observe x
1 +"1. From the point of view of voter i, x
1 +"1 is a realization of the random
variable xi
1 + "1. The voter aims to update his belief about xi
1. The random variables xi
1 and
xi





1 + "1] = i
1,
V ar[xi
1 + "1] = 2
x + 2
". Furthermore, Cov [xi
1;xi
1 + "1] = 2
x. Inserting this in the formulas
for conditional expectations and variances for jointly-normal random variables (see e.g. Hogg
and Craig, 1995, p. 148) yields the result.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof of (i). We omit the time subscript as well as the superscript i when there is no danger of
confusion. Let, for clarity,  denote the random variable whose realization is ^ . The idea of the
proof is to derive the posterior probability ^  for the case that the random variable  falls into






^    ; ^  + 
i
and to consider the limit  ! 0.
Denote by C the event that a politician is competent and by IC the complementary event.
Using the deﬁnition of conditional probabilities, it follows that
P (C j 2 I) =
P ( 2 I jC)
P ( 2 I jC) + (1   )P ( 2 I jIC)
: (A.1)
Note that the denominator is equal to P ( 2 I). In order to consider the limit of (A.1) for the
case where  ! 0, it is useful to rewrite it as






^   fic ()d
R ^ +





30where the two normal densities fc and fic are deﬁned as in the main text preceding Lemma 3.
Sincenormaldensitiesarewell-behaved, itfollowsfromstandardargumentsusingthedeﬁnition







fc(^ ) . Substituting this into (A.2) for  ! 0
and rearranging yields (3).
Proof of (ii). We consider the case that ^    ^ 1  0. (Similar arguments apply to the







. The posterior ^ 1 is taken as given
here. Therefore, it is sufﬁcient to show that
fic(^ )
fc(^ ) increases with ^ . fc is the normal density
describing the distribution of c  ^ x1, while fic is the normal density associated with ic 











































We are interested in the case that  = ^   ^ 1. Lemma 2 implies then that ^   Eic 
Ec = ^ 1 (note that Eic = (1   ) ^ 1 + ^ 1). Hence, ^    Ec  ^    Eic. Furthermore,












=d^  > 0.
The case where ^  < ^ 1 is symmetric and analyzed by following the same steps.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of part (i). This follows directly from Lemma 5 and 6.
Proof of part (ii). Clearly, part (i) implies that there is a unique limit for k ! 1. This
limit is indeed an equilibrium for appropriate off-equilibrium beliefs about a politician’s type
if he deviates from setting g1 = m
1 . For instance, consider the belief, identical across voters,
that a politician setting g1 6= m
1 is incompetent with probability one and that E^ i
1 is sufﬁciently
high. Given this off-equilibrium belief, setting g1 = m
1 maximizes a politician’s probability
of getting reelected from Lemma 4. Thus, a politician does indeed not want to deviate from
g1 = m
1 . Furthermore, voters do not have any incentive deviate from (6).
31Proof of Proposition 3
Denote by gt;c the level of g set in period t by the competent politician and let gt;ic refer to the

















Consider the ﬁrst period. Clearly, 1 = . Using this an inserting for g1;c, g1;ic from


















EV1 is maximized for g1 = x
1 which yields EV FB
1 =  2
". Inserting this and the above
expression into the deﬁnition of Lt yields (10).
We turn next to the second period. We show ﬁrst that it is more likely that a competent
politician gets reelected than that an incompetent politician gets reelected. To establish this,
we show that the probability that (6) holds for the median voter is lower for an incompetent
incumbent than for a competent incumbent. We ﬁrst prove this for ﬁnite k. By Lemma 3,
^ m is a strictly decreasing function of
  ^ 1   ^ m
1
  . By Lemma 6, the median voter’s belief is














1 + k+11. In the case of the competent politician, 1 = x
1. Inserting
this into the expression for g1, then inserting g1 into the expression for ^ 1 and using Lemma
1 yields that ^ 1   ^ m
1 =  "1  c. Similarly, it follows for the incompetent politician that
^ 1   ^ m






variance of c is equal to 22
 and thus strictly smaller than the variance of ic. It follows that
the probability that
  ^ 1   ^ m
1
    A, for any A 2 (0;1), is strictly greater for the incompetent
than for the competent politician. Hence, the probability that ^ m  B, for any B 2 (0;1), is
strictly greater for the incompetent than for the competent politician.
From Lemma 2, E^ m
1 = 

^ 1   ^ m
1







 C, for any C 2 (0;1), is strictly greater for the incompetent incumbent
than for the competent incumbent. Since 2
 does not differ across types, this establishes that
the probability that (6) holds for the median voter is strictly smaller in case of an incompetent
incumbent than in case of a competent incumbent for ﬁnite k.
If k is inﬁnite, ^ 1 cannot be inferred and no information about the incumbent’s type is
observed since we have a pooling equilibrium. Hence, the probability of getting reelected must
be equal for both types. Overall, we have shown that it is more likely that a competent politician
gets reelected than that an incompetent incumbent gets reelected.
There are three events in which the politician in the second period is competent: (1) A
competent incumbent gets reelected; (2) a competent incumbent gets ousted and replaced by a
competent politician; (3) an incompetent incumbent gets ousted and replaced by a competent
politician. Denote the probability that a competent politician gets reelected by c and the prob-
ability that an incompetent politician gets reelected as ic. Denote the event that the second
period politician is competent by C2. We have then
Pr[C2] = c + 
2 (1   c) + (1   )(1   ic)
= [1 + (1   )(c   ic)]  :
(A.4)
The last inequality follows from the fact that it is more likely that a competent politician gets
reelected than that an incompetent politician gets reelected, as shown above. Overall, we have
now established that 2 =  +  for some   0 (see (A.3)).
Inserting the expressions for g2;c, g2;ic given in Proposition 2 into (A.3) yields







". Inserting this and the above expression into the deﬁnition of Lt yields
(11).
33B Sufﬁcient Conditions for the Median Voter Theorem to
Apply
A voter i is pivotal in our model if and only if the following two conditions hold: (i) If the
pivotal voter casts his ballot for the incumbent then at least half of voters prefer the incumbent;
(ii) if the the pivotal voter casts his ballot for the challenger, then at least 50 percent of voters
prefer the challenger. If the two conditions hold for the i associated with the median of i
1 (i.e.
m
1 ), we say that the median voter theorem applies.
We ﬁrst show that a voter i reelects the incumbent if and only if ^ 1 falls within a ﬁnite
interval. The reelection decision is determined by (6). The posterior probability ^ i is a strictly
decreasing function of

 ^ 1   ^ i
1









^ 1   ^ i
1
 
 from Lemma 2. Since ^ i enters negatively on the left-hand





enters positively, it follows that (6) holds if and only if
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. We dub Ii
re voter i’s reelection interval.
The median voter theorem applies if (i) ^ 1 2 Im
re implies that ^ 1 2 Ii
re for at least half
of voters and, conversely, (ii) ^ 1 = 2 Im
re implies that ^ 1 = 2 Ii
re for at least half of voters. The
following lemma states two sufﬁcient conditions for this to hold.




1 for at least half of voters;
(ii) max
1   min






34Proof. Proof of (i). If i
1 = m
1 for at least half of voters then it follows immediately that
^ 1 2 Im
re implies that ^ 1 2 Ii
re for at least half of voters. Conversely, ^ 1 = 2 Im
re implies that
^ 1 = 2 Ii
re for at least half of voters.
Proof of (ii). Using Lemma 1 and (B.1), it can be checked that the condition max
1  min
1 
2crit=(1   ) is equivalent to maxImin
re  minImax
re , where the superscripts min and max
refer to the i with the lowest and highest i
1, respectively. If this holds then ^ 1 2 Im
re implies
that either ^ 1 2 Imax
re or ^ 1 2 Imin
re . The reason is that every point in Im




re is situated between the latter two und the latter two overlap in at least one point.
Furthermore, whenever g 2 Im
re and g 2 Imin
re , then also g 2 Ii




Similarly, whenever g 2 Im
re and g 2 Imax
re , then also g 2 Ii




Hence, in either case, if ^ 1 2 Im
re then ^ 1 belongs to the reelection interval of at least half of
voters.
Consider now the case that ^ 1 = 2 Im
re. It follows that either ^ 1 = 2 Ii




1 or for all i with m
1  i
1  max
1 . In either case, ^ 1 = 2 Ii
re holds for at least 50 percent
of voters. Overall, this establishes that m is pivotal.
Obviously, according to part (i), the voter associated with m
1 is pivotal if a majority of
voters share his belief. The second condition in Lemma 7 limits the range of i
1. In particular,
it requires, that the upper limit of the reelection interval for the voter with the lowest i
1 is at
least as great as the lower limit of the reelection interval for the voter with the highest i
1. It is
possible to derive further sufﬁcient conditions for the median voter theorem to apply.
C Indirect Democracy for Biased 1
As mentioned in the main text, politicians may be understood as a representative sample of
the general population if the political selection process is not biased in favor of the elite or
any other particular group. If politicians are representative for the general population, then
we would expect that the incompetent politician’s signal is related to the distribution of voters’
35beliefs. (For the competent politician, this does not apply, since he observes the truth.) A simple
way of capturing this is assuming that Et is related to m
t   x
t.
In the following, we consider the limit case where, from an objective point of view, Et =
m
t   x
t. By objective we mean from the point of view of the economic theorist analyzing the
problem. In contrast, we need to assume that a politician believes that Et = 0 for himself.
Otherwise, he could make use of the information about Et to unbias his belief about x
t. Sec-
ond, we also assume that voters believe that Et = 0. More precisely, we assume here that a
majority of voters hold beliefs that are identical to the beliefs of the median voter. In this case,
it is indeed appropriate to assume that a majority of voters believe that Et = 0. Otherwise,
their beliefs about Et would be inconsistent with their own beliefs about x
t.
In this case, all positive results in Section 3 continue to hold. However, the welfare expres-















2(k+1) (1   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2
: (C.1)












As to be expected, the terms (x
t   m
t )
2 have a stronger inﬂuence on the welfare loss than in the




than in the case of (C.1). The expression (x
2   m
2 )
2 does not appear at all in Proposition 3.
The overall conclusion is that if the incompetent politician’s signal is biased towards the beliefs
that are prevalent among voters, indirect democracy becomes more similar to direct democracy
as deﬁned in Section 5.
36D Indirect Democracy in the Case of Non-Degenerate Beliefs
of Politicians
Our analysis is based on the assumption that politicians receive a signal t which they use as a
“pointestimate”forx
t inthesenseofclassicalstatistics. Thisintroducesanasymmetrybetween
voters and politicians since the former are Bayesian and hold non-degenerate prior beliefs xi
t.




t  N (t;2
x), wherethesuperscriptpindexesapolitician.
This would affect the analysis insofar as an incumbent politician would be able to update the
probability that he is competent. More important, an incumbent would partially learn about his
bias 1 (under the hypothesis that he is incompetent). An incumbent politician’s updating would
parallel Lemma 2 and 3.
Ifanincumbentpoliticianlearnsabouthisbias1, Assumption2impliesthathecanpartially
“unbias” his signal 2 in period 2. This leads to a further incumbent advantage from the per-
spective of voters since this reduces the expected level of bias in the second period arising from
an incompetent politician if this politician is a reelected incumbent. Since voters would take
this into account, the reelection condition (6) would get somewhat more complicated. Loosely
speaking, the fact that an incumbent can partially unbias his signal reduces the second term on
the left hand side of (6). In spite of this modiﬁcation, the logic of our main results remains
entirely valid.
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